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A growing body of literature indicates that sports teams face incentives to lose games at
the end of the season. This incentive arises from league entry draft policy. We use data from
betting markets to con¯rm the existence of tanking, or the perception of tanking, in the NBA.
Results from a SUR model of point spreads and point di®erences in NBA games indicate that
betting markets believe that tanking takes place in the NBA, even though the evidence that
tanking actually exists is mixed. NBA policy changes also a®ect betting market outcomes.
Keywords: Incentives, betting markets, tanking
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Introduction
Prediction markets, like sports betting markets, e±ciently aggregate information in order to provide
highly accurate forecasts of future outcomes. In betting markets, prices { point spreads or money
line odds { take into account all relevant information related to games and provide a market-based
forecast of game outcomes. In some cases, prices set in gambling markets may re°ect negative
or even illegal activities associated with sporting events. Forrest and Simmons (2003) point out
that the existence of gambling markets makes it easier to detect undesirable behavior, like match
¯xing, that might otherwise go undetected. Wolfers (2006) developed evidence from point spread
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1betting indicating that as many as one in every ¯fty NCAA men's basketball games involved illegal
\point shaving." Larsen, Price, and Wolfers (2008) explore the idea that betting markets contain
information about referees' racial biases. In this paper we examine point spreads for games in the
National Basketball Association (NBA) for evidence that betting markets believe that NBA teams
intentionally lose games at the end of the season in order to obtain a higher pick in the subsequent
NBA entry draft; a behavior called \tanking" in the popular press.
Tanking appears to be a problem in some professional sports leagues that use reverse order
entry drafts to allocate new talent to teams. in this sense, tanking occurs because of league
policy decisions. In many North American professional sports leagues, picks in the amateur entry
draft are awarded based on performance in the previous season, creating an incentive for teams to
intentionally lose games late in the regular season in order to receive a higher draft pick (Preston &
Szymanski, 2003). In response to the perception that tanking took place, the National Basketball
Association (NBA) and National Hockey League (NHL) altered their draft formats on several
occasions in an e®ort to deter teams from tanking and decrease the public perception that teams
intentionally lost games.
Tanking a®ects betting markets in ways similar to match ¯xing. A front o±ce executive for the
Australian Rules Football League (AFL) commented on the relationship between the perception of
tanking in that league and betting on AFL matches: \We want a clean and proper competition.
And now that there is o±cial betting on AFL games, the sport must be seen as clean - very clean"
(Rucci, 2007, n.p.). In October 2009, the Minister of Gaming in Victoria, Australia, launched an
investigation into the possibility that AFL teams were tanking the potential e®ect that tanking
would have on the gambling revenue generated from AFL games (Dowling, 2009).
Tanking could also have a detrimental e®ect on bookmakers and government sponsored sports
betting, which takes place in Canada. If some bettors have information about potential tanking,
an \ine±ciency" exists and informed bettors can earn rents from the information. This hurts
bookmakers ¯nancially because they might not have enough money to pay the winners from the
loser's pool. Also, bookmakers will be reluctant to set point spreads (or money lines) for games
in which tanking could occur because the loss of uncertainty of game outcome harms their ability
to select a proper point spread. If the uncertainty of game outcome is threatened, this a®ects the
e±ciency of betting markets, the revenue generated for bookmakers, the league, and in some cases
2governments. In the case of the NHL and NBA, the league has intervened and made adjustments
to its draft format while in AFL, the government has investigated the consequences of tanking.
This research examines gambling market outcomes for evidence that bookmakers and bettors
believed that tanking occurred in NBA regular season games from the 2003-2004 through 2008-2009
seasons. History indicates that tanking may be a persistent problem in the NBA. The NBA was
the ¯rst professional league to alter its draft format in response to perceptions of tanking. Taylor
and Trogdon (2002) concluded that NBA teams were tanking under certain draft formats because
of the incentive created by the league through its policies. Price, Soebbing, Berri, and Humphreys
(2010) found that as the league provided additional incentives for teams to tank, in the form of
changes in the allocation of entry draft picks and rookie salary caps, NBA teams responded to
that incentive. During the 2003-2004 through 2008-2009 seasons, there was signi¯cant debate in
the popular press about the possibility of some NBA teams tanking late in the season (Soebbing
& Mason, 2009). One such example occurred in the 2006-2007 season, when an article in the Las
Vegas Review-Journal stated that handicappers could detect tanking by certain teams late in the
regular season. According to a prominent handicapper, \it was very apparent to the betting public
that those teams were tanking games" (Youmans, 2007, n. p.).
We develop evidence that betting markets believe that teams tank and the point spreads on
these games change systematically between 1 and 4 points. In addition, we examine the extent to
which the type of opponent (conference or non-conference) faced in a game when tanking may occur
a®ects point spreads. The results indicate that, in some instances, tanking against a conference
foe a®ects the point spread more than tanking against a non-conference opponent. Our ¯nding
that prices set in betting markets re°ect tanking strengthens the argument that tanking is a real
economic phenomena, and not just a statistical artifact, and also reinforces the point that league
policies have important economic consequences.
Sports Betting Markets
Two basic types of bets exist on the winner of an individual sports contest, money line bets and
point spread bets. Money line betting prevails in sports such as hockey, baseball, and European
football where little scoring occurs. Point spread betting is common in professional and college
3football and basketball where more scoring occurs. In point spread betting, the bets are based on
the score di®erence in the game, not on the winner and loser. Bets on the favored team pay o® if
the favorite \covers" the point spread by winning by a margin larger than the point spread. Point
spreads can be interpreted as the price a bettor must pay for a contingent claim on a given amount
of money wagered on the outcome of a game. When the point spread is an integer and the di®erence
in points scored by teams in the game is equal to the point spread, the game is a \push" and all
money is returned to the bettors. Although point spreads can change as new information becomes
available, all point spread bets are evaluated at the point spread posted by the book maker when
the bet was made.
Point spreads are set by bookmakers. Bookmakers maximize pro¯t by collecting money from
losing bets and paying o® winning bets. A book maker's pro¯t margin is called \vigorish" or the
\vig" in point spread betting. To illustrate the vig and pro¯t in point spread betting, consider
what happens when $100 is wagered on a favored team to win a game and $100 is also wagered on
the underdog to \cover" when the point spread is 6 points. The book maker collects $220: $110 to
win $100 from the bettor wagering on the favorite and $110 to win $100 from the bettor wagering
on the underdog. If the favorite wins by 6 or more points, the book maker pays the bettor who
wagered on the favorite $210 and keeps $10 in pro¯t. If the underdog wins, or loses by 5 or fewer
points, the book maker pays $210 to the bettor who wagered on the underdog and keeps $10 in
pro¯t.
Book makers set point spreads to maximize pro¯ts. The book maker can earn a certain pro¯t,
determined by the commission, by setting point spreads to equalize the dollars wagered on each
team. Point spreads also accurately predict outcomes of games, suggesting that point spreads re°ect
all available information about a given game. This property has been investigated extensively in
the literature, and has important implications for the e±ciency of sports betting markets (Sauer,
1998). Research on point spread markets indicate that point spreads almost always predict game
outcomes, and that instances where they do not are infrequent enough to reject the hypothesis of
market e±ciently. In the context of the betting market e±ciency literature, tanking is a fundamental
factor a®ecting game outcomes, and we look for evidence that this fundamental is priced in sports
betting markets.
4Tanking in the NBA
Tanking occurs when teams intentionally lose games. Tanking has been a concern in the NBA
since the early 1980s, when accusations of teams intentionally losing regular season games ¯rst
appeared in media reports. The bene¯t from tanking comes from the opportunity to move up in
the following entry draft to acquire better players, leading to additional wins and revenues in future
seasons (Price, et al, 2010). This behavior is problematic from the standpoint of the league because
it decreases the uncertainty of game outcomes as well as year to year league competitive balance.
As a result, the NBA strategically altered league policy, in terms of its draft format, three times
over the last twenty-¯ve years to deter tanking, or reduce he perception that tanking takes place.
In the early 1980s, the NBA used the traditional reverse order entry draft format. Under this
format, the teams with the worst record in each conference would °ip a coin to determine which
team received the number one overall selection in he next entry draft. Based on concerns that
teams were tanking late in the regular season to receive a 50-50 chance at the number one overall
selection, the NBA altered its policy, beginning with the 1984-1985 season, to give all non-playo®
teams an equal probability of receiving the number one overall selection in the next entry draft.
This equal probability draft format displeased some owners who believed that it did not help the
worst teams in the league to improve, thus a®ecting competitive balance. As a result, beginning
with the 1989-1990 season, the NBA adopted a weighted lottery format that gave the worst teams
in the league a higher probability of receiving the number one overall selection in the following
entry draft. In 1993-1994 season, the NBA adjusted those probabilities to give the worst teams an
even higher probability of receiving the number one overall selection in the draft.
Two previous papers examined how these changes in draft policy a®ected teams' e®ort late
in the regular season. Taylor and Trogdon (2002) examined tanking in the NBA under the ¯rst
three draft formats: the traditional reverse order draft, the equal probability draft, and the ¯rst
weighted lottery draft. Taylor and Trogdon (2002) found evidence that teams tanked late in the
regular season under the reverse order draft format and the weighted lottery draft format. These
two draft formats explicitly rewarded teams for losing when compared to the equal probability
lottery, which did not provide a strong incentive for teams to intentionally lose games late in the
regular season.
5Price et al (2010) extended Taylor and Trogdon's (2002) research by including all regular season
games in the 1977-1978 through 2007-2008 seasons, a period containing all entry draft formats used
by the NBA. Their results showed that NBA teams responded to increasing incentives to tank by
engaging in this behavior more frequently. Research on tanking in other sports, including the
NCAA Men's College Basketball tournament (Balsdon, Fong, & Thayer, 2007) and Australian
Rules Football (Borland, Chieu, & Macdonald, 2009), contains mixed evidence that teams tank,
perhaps because of weaker incentives in those leagues.
This paper assumes that tanking exists, and looks for evidence that betting markets behave
as if book makers and bettors believe that tanking takes place. Again, we assume that tanking
can be thought of as an unobserved fundamental in the NBA betting market, much like Brown
and Sauer (1993b), who identi¯ed factors like match up problems, changes in the composition of
teams from season to season, and injuries to star players as important unobservable fundamentals
a®ecting betting markets.
Data
We analyze point spreads, game outcomes, and game characteristics data from 7,339 regular sea-
son NBA games from the 2003-2004 through 2007-2008 regular seasons. The point spread data
come from Sports Insights, a subscription service that provides data from betting markets. Game
characteristics data were collected from multiple sources including ESPN and DatabaseBasketball
(http://www.databasebasketball.com). We calculated the point at which teams clinched playo®
berths or were eliminated from playo® contention by hand for each NBA season, based on the
standard \magic number" formula. Table 1 contains summary statistics for the sample.
7,339 regular season games were played in the NBA over the sample period. The mean ¯nal
point spread, expressed as favored home teams minus points and underdog home teams plus points,
was -3.42 which means that the average home team was just under a 3.5 point favorite during the
sample period. The mean di®erence in points scored was -3.29 meaning that the home team won
by just more than 3 points on average. Note that the variance of the di®erence in points scored
exceeds the variance of the point spread by a signi¯cant amount. Actual game outcomes are much
more variable than point spreads, even though point spreads are good predictors of game outcomes.
6Table 1: Summary Statistics (N=7,339)
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max Skewness
Final Point spread -3.42 6.04 -22.5 17 0.29
Di®erence in Points -3.29 12.71 -52 50 0.05
Forecast Error 0.13 11.35 -46.5 46.5 -0.03
Total Points Scored 195.46 21.27 124 318 0.37
Home Team Covered 0.48 0.50 0 1 0.07
Away Team Clinch 0.06 0.23 0 1 |-
Home Team Clinch 0.06 0.23 0 1 |-
Away Team Elim. 0.05 0.21 0 1 |-
Home Team Elim. 0.05 0.21 0 1 |-
This feature also occurs in other betting markets. The forecast error shows that on average, the
visiting team performed slightly better than predicted by the ¯nal point spread. The average total
combined points scored by the two opposing teams in a game was 195. The home team covered, or
won by more than the point spread if favored and lost by less than the point spread if not favored,
in 48 percent of the games in the sample. A value of zero for the skewness statistic indicates a
normally distributed variable.
The last four variables show the percentage of games in the sample in which the home and
visiting team had already clinched a postseason appearance or had been eliminated from playo®
contention. We identi¯ed the teams that had clinched playo® appearances or been eliminated from
playo® contention using the standard \magic number" formula. The skewness statistic indicates
variables with a large amount of probability mass in one tail. Skewness statistics cannot be applied
to dichotomous variables. the last four variables identify teams with an incentive to tank late in the
regular season. Teams who have been eliminated from playo® contention have a reduced incentive
to win games, and an increased incentive to lose because losses improve their probability of getting
the ¯rst pick in the next entry draft. in the next section, we perform formal tests of the importance
of tanking in determining both game outcomes and point spreads.
Empirical Analysis
To examine the e®ect of tanking on point spreads in NBA games, we use a SUR regression model
similar to the one used by Brown and Sauer (1993a) to analyze the relationship between game
7outcomes and point spreads in the NBA. Brown and Sauer (1993a) model the determination of
point spreads as a function of team strengths and other fundamental factors that a®ect point








where s indexes seasons, t indexes games, h indexes home teams and a indexes away teams. ®ps
captures home court advantage built into NBA point spreads. HThgs is a vector of indicator
variables that capture the ability or strength of the home team in game g in season s. ATags is
a vector of indicator variables that capture the ability or strength of the away team in game g in
season s. hclinchhgs, aclinchags, helimhgs, and aelimags are indicator variables identifying home
or away teams that already clinched (clinch) a postseason spot or were already eliminated (elim)
from postseason contention before game g in season s. ²
ps
hags is the equation error term capturing
all other factors that a®ect point spreads for regular season NBA games. We assume that ²hags is





¯1, ¯2, ¯3, and ¯4 are unknown parameters to be estimated.
The parameters ¯3, and ¯4 will re°ect the extent to which betting market participants believe
that tanking takes place in the NBA. The only teams with a clear incentive to lose games to improve
their position in the next entry draft are teams who have been eliminated from playo® contention.
A team still in contention for a playo® spot will still have an incentive to win games, as the ¯nancial
pay o® from playo® appearances, in terms of additional home games and television appearances, is
large. ¯3, and ¯4 will capture any systematic variation in point spreads for games involving teams
who have an incentive to tank. If these parameters are di®erent from zero, then some evidence that
participants in betting markets believe that tanking takes place exists.
Brown and Sauer (1993a) also model the determination of game outcomes, in this context the








In equation 2, the game outcome equation, s, t, h and a and the explanatory variables are
de¯ned as in equation 1. ®dp captures the actual home court advantage in NBA games. ²
dp
hags
is the equation error term capturing all other factors that a®ect point spreads for regular season





h , ¯1, ¯2, ¯3, and ¯4 are unknown parameters to be estimated.
The parameters °3, and °4 re°ect the extent to which taking occurs in the NBA. The only teams
with a clear incentive to lose games to improve their position in the next entry draft are teams who
have been eliminated from playo® contention. ¯3, and ¯4 will capture any systematic variation in
game outcomes for games involving teams who have an incentive to tank. If these parameters are
di®erent from zero, then some evidence that NBA teams tanking late in the regular season.
Like Brown and Sauer (1993a), we estimate equations 1 and 2 using Seeming Unrelated Regres-
sion (SUR) technique using GLS to control for any heteroscedasticity in the equation error terms.
We estimate equation 1 separately for each season in the sample, in order to control for year to
year variation in team quality due to personnel and management changes. An alternative approach
would be to pool games across seasons and add season-speci¯c indicator variables. However, this
would force the team quality indicators to be equal across seasons. The GLS approach also accounts






Table 2 contains estimates of the home and away team ability index parameters, µa, µh in equations
1 and 2.1 The parameter estimates capture the ability of each team in that season relative to the
omitted team, the Atlanta Hawks. In 2004-2005, the Hawks were the worst team in the NBA,
recording only 13 victories in the regular season. Recall that point spreads are expressed as home
team minus the point spread when the home team is favored and plus the point spread when the
1The results for other seasons are available upon request. In addition, the Oklahoma City Thunder encompasses
both the current Oklahoma City team and the old Seattle Supersonics team who relocated in Oklahoma City for the
2008-2009 season.
9home team is the underdog. The estimated parameters on the home ability indicators are negative
and generally signi¯cant, indicating that home teams were, on average, favored and stronger at
home than the Hawks, although the Bobcats were not signi¯cantly stronger than the Hawks, based
on the t-statistics on Table 2.2 The away ability indexes are positive and generally signi¯cant,
indicating that the away teams in the league were, on average, underdogs in games and stronger
on the road than the Hawks. Brown and Sauer (1993b) point out that these estimates, combined
with the estimated home court advantage, ^ ®, can be used to create a predicted point spread for
any NBA game in the 2004-2005 NBA season.
Table 2: Home and Away Ability Index, 2004-2005 Season
Point Spread Model Game Outcome Model
Home Ability Away Ability Home Ability Away Ability
Franchise Name Coef. Z-stat Coef. Z-stat Coef. Z-stat Coef. Z-stat
Boston Celtics -7.99 -12.10 7.41 11.29 -9.42 -3.94 9.71 4.09
Charlotte Bobcats -1.09 -1.68 0.47 0.72 -4.64 -1.97 2.17 0.92
Chicago Bulls -5.75 -8.68 5.01 7.63 -9.96 -4.16 10.10 4.25
Cleveland Cavaliers -10.28 -15.53 7.97 12.16 -12.43 -5.19 6.44 2.71
Dallas Mavericks -13.42 -20.22 12.76 19.34 -13.64 -5.68 17.09 7.15
Denver Nuggets -10.34 -15.60 7.57 11.50 -13.83 -5.76 9.35 3.92
Detroit Pistons -12.17 -18.42 11.48 17.46 -11.94 -5.00 13.51 5.68
Golden State Warriors -6.59 -10.07 4.66 7.14 -7.72 -3.26 7.47 3.16
Houston Rockets -10.28 -15.49 9.95 15.10 -11.60 -4.83 14.75 6.19
Indiana Pacers -7.10 -10.74 6.43 9.81 -8.72 -3.64 10.70 4.51
Los Angeles Clippers -8.07 -12.28 5.92 9.04 -10.68 -4.49 7.12 3.01
Los Angeles Lakers -7.78 -11.81 6.31 9.63 -8.34 -3.50 5.41 2.28
Memphis Grizzlies -10.57 -15.94 8.53 12.96 -10.87 -4.53 12.82 5.38
Miami Heat -12.27 -18.52 12.56 19.04 -14.73 -6.15 15.36 6.44
Milwaukee Bucks -6.68 -10.17 5.02 7.71 -9.56 -4.02 3.05 1.30
Minnesota Timberwolves -10.86 -16.35 11.24 17.10 -9.64 -4.01 11.87 4.99
New Jersey Nets -5.97 -9.05 4.97 7.60 -6.77 -2.84 7.96 3.36
New Orleans Hornets -2.56 -3.92 1.20 1.84 -2.31 -0.98 4.07 1.73
New York Knickerbockers -7.14 -10.86 5.16 7.92 -7.36 -3.09 5.46 2.32
Oklahoma City Thunder -11.15 -16.82 9.36 14.20 -11.28 -4.70 13.01 5.45
Orlando Magic -8.14 -12.33 6.33 9.69 -7.34 -3.07 5.78 2.45
Philadelphia 76ers -7.97 -12.04 6.61 10.08 -7.41 -3.09 8.91 3.76
Phoenix Suns -14.15 -21.22 14.88 22.54 -14.71 -6.10 17.74 7.42
Portland Trail Blazers -6.28 -9.61 5.27 8.07 -5.35 -2.26 6.46 2.74
Sacramento Kings -12.13 -18.34 10.30 15.65 -13.82 -5.77 9.93 4.17
San Antonio Spurs -15.50 -23.30 15.33 23.05 -18.69 -7.77 16.09 6.69
Toronto Raptors -5.60 -8.53 4.84 7.40 -6.87 -2.89 7.80 3.30
Utah Jazz -7.24 -11.09 4.92 7.55 -6.42 -2.72 4.84 2.05
Washington Wizards -8.68 -13.15 5.69 8.69 -10.60 -4.44 6.48 2.73
The parameters of interest are those on the indicator variables for teams that had clinched
playo® sports or been eliminated from the playo®s at game time in the SUR model. Table 3 reports
the SUR parameter estimates and P-values on each of the playo® clinch and elimination indicator
variables for each season in the sample for the point spread equation, equation 1, and the game
2For the 2004-2005 season, the Charlotte Bobcats were an expansion team.
10outcome equation, equation 2. The point spread equation explains between 75 and 82 percent of
the observed variation in point spreads in each of the seasons, while the game outcome equation
explains much less of the observed variation in points scored. This is not surprising, given that point
di®erences are much more variable than point spreads. The parameter on the indicator variables
for teams that had clinched playo® berths before the game was played in the point spread model
are only occasionally signi¯cant, in 2003 for home teams, and in 2005 and 2008 for away teams.
Point spreads for games involving teams that have clinched a playo® berth are not often di®erent
from point spreads for games not involving playo® bound teams, holding the relative quality of the
teams involved constant. The estimated parameters on the indicator variables for games involving
teams that have already been eliminated from playo® contention are all statistically signi¯cant.
The estimated parameters for home teams that have been eliminated are positive and signi¯cant,
suggesting that home teams that have been eliminated from playo® contention are not favored by
as much as teams that have not been eliminated from playo® contention, holding the relative
quality of the teams involved constant. The estimated parameters for away teams that have been
eliminated are negative and signi¯cant in the point spread model, suggesting that home teams
playing opponents who have been eliminated from playo® contention are favored by more than
home teams playing opponents that have not been eliminated from playo® contention, holding
the relative quality of the teams involved constant. This is evidence that book makers and bettors
believe that NBA teams are tanking. Home teams that have been eliminated from playo® contention
could be planing to tank, and these teams are not favored in betting markets by as much as teams
with no incentive to tank. Visiting teams that have been eliminated from playo® contention also
have an incentive to tank, and these teams are bigger underdogs than visiting teams that have no
incentive to tank. The point spreads for games involving teams with an incentive to tank di®er
systematically from the point spreads for games involving teams with no incentive to tank, and
the point spread adjustment is consistent with the idea that betting markets expect teams with an
incentive to tank to put forth less e®ort in the game.
The evidence that tanking actually occurs in the NBA is not strong, based on the results from
the game outcome equation. The estimated parameters for away teams that have been eliminated
are not statistically di®erent from zero in any of the six seasons in the game outcome equation,
suggesting that home teams playing opponents who have been eliminated from playo® contention
11do not outscore their opponents by more than would be expected, holding the relative quality of the
teams involved constant. The estimated parameters for home teams that have been eliminated are
not statistically di®erent from zero in ¯ve of the six seasons in the game outcome model. Despite
the fact that betting markets believe in tanking, little evidence of tanking can be found in the
game outcome model. Recall that both Taylor and Trogdon (2002) and Price et al (2010) found
evidence of tanking in the NBA. These papers estimated the probability that a team would win a
given game, not the di®erence in points scored, a di®erent approach to detecting tanking. Point
di®erences on NBA games exhibit a great deal of variability, much more than point spreads, making
it di±cult to detect tanking in point di®erences. In addition, tanking requires only that a team
loses a game, not that the team gets blown out; this makes tests based in the conditional probability
of winning a game better suited to detecting tanking than tests based on the conditional analysis
of the di®erence in points scored.
Some interesting patterns also emerge when the events surrounding some of the seasons in the
sample is considered. For example, during the 2006-2007 season, one newspaper reported that the
season was unusual from a tanking standpoint, going as far as to suggest that fans thought that
games could be ¯xed (Youmans, 2007). Price et al (2010) did not ¯nd evidence that tanking took
place in this season. From Table 3, the size of the estimated parameters on the elimination indicator
variables from the 2006-2007 season are larger in the higher those for the 2005-2006 season; the size
of the parameter on the away team being eliminated doubles from 2005-2006 to 2006-2007. The
point spread adjustment for tanking was larger, suggesting that betting markets believed tanking
was more likely in 2006-2007. This pattern is consistent with a newspaper reporter believing that
tanking was worse in 2006-2007 than in the previous season. Interestingly, the estimated parameters
on the elimination variables for the 2007-2008 season indicate that the point spread adjustment
for tanking was even larger in 2007-2008 then in the previous two seasons. This could be due to
variation in the quality of players available in the upcoming entry draft. Price et al (2010) point out
that the incentive to tank may vary with expectations about the potential new entrants available
in the draft. The top three picks in the 2007 draft were Greg Oden, Kevin Durant, and Al Horford.
The top 3 picks in the 2008 NBA Draft featured players such as Derrick Rose (the number one
pick), Michael Beasley, and O.J. Mayo. If the 2008 class was perceived as stronger at the end of
the 2007-2008 NBA season, then book makers and bettors might expect that the incentive to tank
12was greater, and adjust point spreads accordingly. This period corresponds to the ¯rst two years
that the NBA adopted a minimal age requirement for draft entrants. Previously, a player could
be drafted straight from high school. The rule currently states that a players must be one year
removed from high school in order to be eligible for the NBA draft. This extra year may provide
teams with a better indication of player talent and how the player projects as player in the NBA.
Table 3: SUR Results by Season
Variable 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Point Spread Model
Home Clinch -0.961 0.051 0.585 -0.550 -0.113 0.695
0.013 0.913 0.151 0.173 0.804 0.092
Away Clinch 0.347 -0.810 -1.134 0.593 -0.868 -0.847
0.396 0.077 0.003 0.152 0.069 0.038
Home Eliminated 2.888 1.341 1.721 2.593 4.021 1.190
<0.001 0.003 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.003
Away Eliminated -1.380 -0.976 -1.824 -2.173 -3.713 -1.365
0.011 0.036 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
® -3.711 -2.255 -3.384 -2.676 -3.900 -5.072
<0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
R2 0.757 0.762 0.772 0.755 0.818 0.822
Game Outcome Model
Home Clinch -1.840 -2.301 3.043 2.023 -1.660 2.770
0.214 0.172 0.070 0.223 0.339 0.099
Away Clinch -1.331 -4.762 -3.037 -0.474 -2.461 -4.261
0.396 0.004 0.052 0.780 0.176 0.010
Home Eliminated 2.681 3.017 2.529 4.842 2.428 1.025
0.198 0.069 0.205 0.022 0.135 0.523
Away Eliminated 2.204 -0.131 -0.434 -0.959 -0.193 -0.812
0.290 0.938 0.830 0.656 0.901 0.597
® -8.421 -2.402 -2.674 -5.549 -4.609 -4.953
<0.001 0.320 0.282 0.030 0.065 0.045
R2 0.239 0.247 0.203 0.203 0.330 0.284
We ran a number of robustness checks to test the strength of these results. The robustness
checks focus on whether or not helimhgs and aelimhgs actually identify the perception or presence
of tanking in the point spread model, or just re°ect poor team performance at the end of the
season and examine if the ability indexes estimated for the entire regular season represent an
appropriate time frame to control for home and away team ability. Injuries, exhaustion, and player
acquisions/releases over the course of a season could lead to signi¯cant changes in a team's ability,
13especially later in the season. Estimating team ability over the entire regular season assumes
constant team ability. To address this issue, we estimated a separate model which allowed a team's
ability to vary across groups of about 20 games. This model included the team ¯xed e®ects from
the SUR model interacted with a vector of indicator variables for each 20 game period. The results
from this regression were qualitatively similar to the results on Table 3 that assume constant team
ability over the entire season. This suggests that the elimination variable captures tanking, and
not just poor play at the end of the season.
The incentive for a team to tank might also change depending on the conference a±liation of
the opposing team. Teams may be reluctant to tank in a game against a conference opponent,
because conference opponents are bigger rivals, or because they play each other more frequently.
To investigate this possibility, we estimated an alternative model that interacts the elimination
indicator variables with an indicator variable for conference opponents. Table 4 shows the results
for a this model. The home clinch variables are signi¯cant in 2003, 2006, and 2007. The away
team clinch variables are signi¯cant in 2003 and 2006. Based on the estimated parameters on
the elimination indicator variables interacted with the conference opponent indicator variable, the
perception that tanking exists when eliminated home teams are playing non conference opponents,
but not for games involving conference opponents. Eliminated away teams playing conference
opponents did have a signi¯cant point spread adjustment of approximately 2.3 points to the home
team.
The variable for when home team eliminated from playo® contention and playing a conference
opponent is signi¯cant in 2003, 2004, and 2007. If the home team is eliminated and plays an
opponent from the other conference, that parameter is signi¯cant in 2006 and 2007. If the away
team is eliminated and plays against a team from the same conference, that parameter is signi¯cant
in 2006 and 2007. For an eliminated visiting team who plays a team from the other conference, none
of the seasons are signi¯cant.3 These models explain between 75 and 82 percent of the observed
variation.
Did point spreads vary systematically by the type of opponent? Under the current draft format
there is no additional incentive for a team to tank against a conference opponent; under earlier
draft formats the bottom two teams in each conference °ipped a coin for the number one overall
3The parameter in the 2004 season has a p-value of 0.051.
14Table 4: SUR Results with Elimination Interaction Term by Season
Variable 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Point Spread Model
Home Clinch -1.285 -0.513 -0.055 -0.940 -1.351 0.253
0.001 0.255 0.884 0.019 0.003 0.523
Away Clinch 1.005 -0.306 -0.623 1.251 0.398 -0.449
0.009 0.474 0.083 0.001 0.395 0.249
Home Eliminated*Conf Opponent 1.675 1.531 1.520 1.529 4.338 0.822
0.049 0.045 0.067 0.117 <0.001 0.263
Away Eliminated*Conf Opponent -2.022 -0.215 -1.533 -2.326 -4.616 -0.568
0.034 0.768 0.125 0.029 <0.001 0.452
Home Eliminated*NonConf Opponent 1.445 -0.089 -0.026 2.969 2.465 0.953
0.212 0.925 0.981 0.013 0.001 0.165
Away Eliminated*NonConf Opponent -0.981 2.310 0.121 -1.461 -1.037 -1.097
0.290 0.051 0.898 0.234 0.155 0.084
® -3.385 -2.251 -3.448 -2.706 -3.937 -8.200
<0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
R2 0.753 0.762 0.769 0.751 0.807 0.820
| | | | | |
Game Outcome Model
Home Clinch -2.051 -3.043 2.707 1.741 -1.880 2.746
0.148 0.062 0.080 0.285 0.258 0.086
Away Clinch -0.481 -3.680 -2.473 0.393 -1.922 -3.929
0.744 0.017 0.093 0.803 0.267 0.012
Home Eliminated*Conf Opponent -2.544 1.489 1.763 2.476 2.931 2.332
0.431 0.590 0.604 0.533 0.395 0.432
Away Eliminated*Conf Opponent 4.132 0.386 0.274 1.123 -0.403 -3.985
0.254 0.884 0.947 0.796 0.902 0.192
Home Eliminated*NonConf Opponent 1.827 0.722 1.524 12.602 2.337 -4.468
0.678 0.833 0.728 0.010 0.381 0.107
Away Eliminated*NonConf Opponent 6.013 4.444 0.333 -10.860 0.308 -0.765
0.088 0.299 0.931 0.030 0.909 0.765
® -7.644 -1.984 -2.626 -5.243 -4.652 -4.930
0.001 0.411 0.294 0.040 0.062 0.046
R2 0.239 0.246 0.202 0.206 0.330 0.287
| | | | | |
selection. This format created an additional incentive to lose to a conference opponent, as the
easiest way to improve draft position was to lose to conference opponents. The results from Table 4
show that when the eliminated home team plays a conference opponent, the point spread increases
by 1.5 to 4.3 points depending on the season. Three of the six seasons are signi¯cant (2003, 2004,
2007). When facing non-conference opponents, the point spread increases between 2.5 and 3 points.
15Eliminated road teams facing conference opponents increase the point spread between 2 and 4.5
points than road teams that had not been eliminated from playo® contention. This is signi¯cant
in two of the six seasons. That could be due to a strong real or perceived home court advantage
in the NBA. When facing non conference opponents, only one of the elimination indicators are
signi¯cant. This would seem to give credence to the perception among bettors that conference
games have additional bene¯t for a team who tanks late in the regular season. When examining
the actual di®erence in points, only two of the parameters are signi¯cant. Both of these signi¯cant
results occur in the 2006-2007 NBA.
Conclusion
This paper examines that participants in betting markets believe NBA teams tank late in the regular
season. We examine both point spreads and di®erences in points scored in regular season NBA
games from the 2003-2004 through 2008-2009 seasons. We ¯nd that the perception of tanking a®ects
point spreads in games involving teams eliminated from playo® contention during these seasons,
and it a®ects the point spread systematically based on the presence of a conference opponent in the
game. Only an insider familiar with the strategies discussed and implemented by NBA teams out
of contention late in the season can know with certainty if teams tank to improve their prospects in
the entry draft. Previous evidence analyzed only game outcomes to assess the likelihood that teams
tank. Our evidence indicates that participants in betting markets behave in a way consistent with
the existence of tanking in NBA games late in the regular season, providing additional evidence
that tanking actually takes place. The evidence that tanking takes place, based on the game
outcome model, is weaker than the evidence that the betting market believes that tanking takes
place. However, this result could be attributed to the fact that the di®erence in points is possibly
the wrong margin in which to look for evidence of tanking - a team that tanks only has to lose
the game, it does not have to lose the game by a large margin. The fact that tanking is harder
to detect in point di®erences than in tests based on the conditional probability of losing a game,
the approach used by Taylor and Trogdon (2002) and Price et al (2010), highlights the fact that
tanking is not easy to detect and a complex phenomena.
Our result that betting markets believe that tanking takes place, despite little evidence that
16tanking actually takes place, is similar to the results in Brown and Sauer (1993a), who found that
betting markets believe in the hot hand, but ¯nd little evidence that the hot hand actually exists in
NBA games. This result is also consistent with the idea that prediction markets e±ciently aggregate
information. Even though tanking appears to be di±cult to detect, betting markets clearly build
a tanking adjustment into point spreads on games involving teams with an incentive to tank.
The results of this research could be important for the NBA, as it provides information about
the e®ects of policy changes on team behavior. The NBA has been the most active of the four
major North American professional sports leagues in altering its draft policy in response to the
perception that teams tank late in the regular season. The results here show that this perception
exists, in that betting markets continue to adjust point spreads for tanking in late season games.
Based on Camerer's (1989) research and our results, it appears that the NBA believes in the
\myth of tanking" and altered league policies in order to manage these perceptions. Managing this
public perception is important, regardless of the existence of actual tanking in the NBA, because
the perception a®ects the legitimacy of the NBA's core product, professional basketball games with
uncertain outcomes. The results of our research from recent seasons with no change in draft policies
indicates that betting markets still believe tanking takes place. The NBA may need to consider
adjusting its draft format once again.
Future research could examine the point spreads and di®erences in points scored for older NBA
games. By using point spreads back to the 1980s, an analysis of point spreads could see if tanking
had e®ects in betting markets under other draft formats, and compare the size of the tanking
adjustments to assess the e®ectiveness of the NBA draft policy. In addition, analyzing older games
could help to assess the e®ectiveness of the equal weight draft lottery used in the mid 1980s, which
was implemented to completely eliminate any incentive for teams to tank. Taylor and Trogdon
(2002) concluded that no tanking took place under this draft format.
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